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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act"),' Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme for regulating
the national securities markets. Pursuant to that scheme, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission7) was
given ultimate authority to enforce the newly enacted securities
laws against market participants. The Exchange Act also creat-
* Richard L. Stone is a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft in New
York. Michael A. Perino is an associate at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft and
a recent LL.M. graduate of Columbia University School of Law. The authors
would like to thank Aron S. Jaroslawicz, an associate at Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, for his assistance with this article.
1 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (1994).
ed a prominent enforcement role for national securities ex-
changes ("Exchanges"), like the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE").2 Congress required these self-regulatory organiza-
tions ("SROs") as a condition for their continued operation to
enforce, among other things, compliance by their members with
the provisions of the Exchange Act and the rules and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder.' The SROs were also given the
power to sanction those members the SRO found to have violat-
ed federal law.4
The power and enforcement responsibilities conferred upon
SROs under the Exchange Act raise the issue of whether con-
stitutional protections such as due process and the right
against self-incrimination apply in SRO enforcement proceed-
ings when the SRO is enforcing federal law. The answer to that
question, however, turns on whether SROs are "state actors"
when enforcing federal law.5 State action' is a fundamental
prerequisite in cases alleging deprivation of constitutionally
protected rights.7 "[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution
are protected only against infringement by governments."' At
issue is whether SROs should be subject to the same constitu-
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994).
3 Id § 78f(bXl).
4 Id § 78f(b)(6).
' Many commentators have argued that the state action concept is neither
doctrinally sound nor necessary. See, e.g., Robert J. Glennon & John E. Nowak,
A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment 'State Action" Requirement,
1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221, 232-33 [hereinafter Glennon and Nowak]; LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 18-1 to 18-7 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter TRIBE]. For example, Glennon and Nowak argue for a balancing approach to
determine whether private actions should be subject to constitutional require-
ments. For Glennon and Nowak, the question is not whether there is "state ac-
tion," but rather "whether it is permissible for the state to define the rights of
private persons so as to allow the challenged practice to exist." Glennon and
Nowak at 233. Although this theory provides a useful conceptual tool, it has not
yet been adopted by the Supreme Court.
' As used in this Article, "state action" refers to any governmental action at
whatever level, be it local, state or federal.
' Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ("The
Constitution's protections of individual liberty and equal protection apply in
general only to action by the government."); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,
191 (1988); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
' Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). See Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883).
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tional limitations as the government when they are acting in
the same capacity as the government in enforcing federal law,
as required of them by the Exchange Act. Despite the Supreme
Court's extensive jurisprudence on the state action question, the
Court has not addressed the issue of whether SROs are state
actors. Lower courts have split on the question of whether
SROs are state actors. 9
The purpose of this Article is to explain why SROs should be
considered state actors when enforcing federal law. The various
Supreme Court precedents discussing the state action issue
strongly suggest that when enforcing federal law, as they are
required to do under the Exchange Act, SROs are state actors.
In that situation, SROs should be subject to the same constitu-
tional limitations as the Commission or any other government
agency.
In Section H, the Article first examines the disciplinary re-
sponsibility of SROs imposed by the Exchange Act including the
powers which the Commission has to coerce enforcement activi-
ty on the part of an SRO.' Both the statutory and regulatory
frameworks are analyzed. This Section then goes on to demon-
strate the symbiotic relationship that exists between the
Commission and the SROs in the context of SRO rule-making.
This analysis examines the Commission's role in approving
rules and its authority to amend SRO rules and require SROs
to adopt rules. This analysis is significant because the
Commission's authority in the rule-making area effectively
allows the Commission to coerce SRO action, and because it
demonstrates the heavily regulated nature of SRO activity.
' Compare, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975)
(stating that New York Stock Exchange investigation of defendant did not
trigger privilege against self-incrimination) and First Heritage Corp. v. National
Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (arguing
that NASD is not a state actor) with Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American
Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The intimate involvement of
the Exchange with the [Commission] brings it within the purview of the Fifth
Amendment controls over governmental due process.") and United States v.
Sloan, 388 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that defendant at New York
Stock Exchange proceeding can invoke privilege against self-incrimination). See
also In re Abercrombie, Exchange Act Release No. 16,285, [1979 Transfer Bind-
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,342 (Oct. 18, 1979) (stating that NASD is not
a federal agency for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination).
" See infra Section 11.
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Section H then applies this analysis to the state action tests
the Supreme Court currently employs." The Supreme Court
has articulated several distinct tests for determining whether
state action exists. This Section addresses two of the more
relevant tests: (1) the "coercion" or "encouragement" test; and
(2) the "public function" test. The Section explains the history
and policy considerations that underlie each of these two tests,
and demonstrates that under each of these tests SROs enforc-
ing federal law should be considered state actors.
In Section IV, the Article analyzes lower court decisions that
have addressed the general topic of state action in the context
of SROs.
Finally, in Section V, the Article concludes that SROs are
state actors when they enforce federal law. This conclusion not
only follows from the Supreme Court's extensive state action
jurisprudence, but is also bolstered by the common sense argu-
ment that a dual system for enforcement of federal securities
laws - one providing full constitutional protections and the
other providing no such constitutional protections - is illogical.
This dual enforcement system, which can lead to outcome deter-
minative results based solely upon the prosecutorial forum, has
a recognized historical foundation but is unsupported by current
state action jurisprudence.
II. SROs AND DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
In May of 1934, Congress passed the Fletcher-Rayburn Bill,
regulating Exchanges and creating an enforcement agency
known as the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission"). This bill, now known as the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), was a function of political
compromise.' Rather than being authorized to directly regu-
late all aspects of trading on Exchanges, the Commission's
mandate was to supervise the self-regulatory activities of the
existing twenty-one Exchanges which themselves would have
primary responsibility for enforcing the Exchange Act, Commis-
sion regulations, and their own rules, regulations, and policy
"' See infra Section III.
'2 H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934) [hereinafter House Re-
port].
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statements governing trading and member activity. William 0.
Douglas, the second Chairman of the Commission, described the
purpose of the Exchange Act. "[The Exchange Act lets] the
exchanges take the leadership with government playing a resid-
ual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak,
behind the door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned, and ready for use
but with a hope it would never have to be used."'
More recently, Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,'4  described this
self-regulation. 'The purpose of the self-regulation provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act was to delegate governmental pow-
er to working institutions which would undertake at their own
initiative to enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal
standards in a complex and changing industry.""5
In the same case, Justice Goldberg described the relationship
between the Commission and the Exchanges as a "partnership
between government and private enterprise." 6 The Commis-
sion itself has described this relationship. 'There are, no doubt,
many other instances in which the policy of entrusting a degree
of social control to "private" groups has been adopted, but secu-
rities regulation is unique in featuring self-regulation as an
essential and officially sanctioned part of the regulatory pat-
tern."
7
This political compromise, delegating authority to the Ex-
changes to enforce federal law, was by no means illogical. Ex-
changes had already been in operation and had a history of
self-governance. More importantly, there was no federal entity
with expertise in the regulation of the securities market. In
fact, substantial consideration was given to authorizing the
Federal Trade Commission to supervise and regulate the en-
forcement activities of the Exchanges."8 The ultimate delega-
tion of authority to Exchanges was, however, by no means
complete. The Commission was given supervisory jurisdiction
13 WLIam 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed., 1940).
14 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
' Id. at 371.
16 Id. at 366.
17 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURrTIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No.
95, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1963) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
1" House Report, supra note 12.
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over SRO enforcement actions and authority to enforce directly
violations of the Act and other federal securities laws.
The Exchange Act sets forth various statutory requirements
with respect to the prosecution of disciplinary proceedings.
These requirements evidence a delegation of authority to en-
force federal law and a symbiotic enforcement relationship with
the Commission.
A. Disciplinary Standards for Exchanges
Section 6(b) of the Act specifies the requisites for an
Exchange to be registered.' 9 This section states that the rules
of an Exchange must provide that member firms and their
associated persons will be appropriately disciplined for viola-
tions of the Exchange Act or Exchange rules. The punishments
an SRO can mete out to its members include expulsion, suspen-
sion, limitation of activities, functions and operations, fine, or
censure. Section 6(b)(7) requires that the rules of an Exchange
must be in accordance with Section 6(d) and in general must
provide a fair procedure with respect to the discipline of mem-
bers and persons associated with members, the denial of mem-
bership to any person seeking membership therein, the barring
of any person from becoming associated with any member firm,
and the prohibition or limitation by the Exchange of any person
with respect to access to or services offered by the Exchange or
its members.
Section 6(d) establishes procedural protections similar to
constitutional due process requirements.0 Section 6(d) also
provides that in any disciplinary proceeding the Exchange must
bring specific charges, notify the member or associated person
of the charges, and provide the accused an opportunity to de-
fend against the charges. The Exchange must also maintain a
record of the proceedings. Each disciplinary sanction the Ex-
change imposes must be supported by a statement specifying
the act or practice in which the member or associated person
engaged and the specific provision of the Act, the Commission
rules, or the rules of the Exchange which the member or associ-
ated person is deemed to have violated. The Exchange must
19 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1994).
20 Id § 78f(d).
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also describe the sanction imposed and the reasons therefor.
Exchange disciplinary proceedings are typically conducted in a
hearing held before an Exchange hearing panel consisting of
three persons,2' typically members, associated persons and em-
ployees of members who are appointed by the Exchange. The
hearing officers are employees of the Exchange who are usually
not involved in the investigation of disciplinary proceedings.
During the prehearing phase of a disciplinary proceeding, the
hearing officer is empowered to resolve all procedural and evi-
dentiary matters relating to the hearing, though generally no
formal discovery mechanisms are available to parties charged
by an Exchange. Often, disciplinary officers and parties attempt
to reach an informal agreement with respect to discovery. At
the hearing stage, strict compliance with the formal rules of
evidence is typically not required.2 Ordinarily, the hearing
officer determines all questions regarding the admissibility of
testimony and documents into evidence.' The hearing panel
typically decides by majority vote. Upon the imposition of final
disciplinary action, an Exchange is required to write a notice to
the Commission with sufficient information regarding the back-
ground factual basis and issues involved in the proceeding to
enable the Commission to determine whether the case should
be called up for review on the Commission's own motion, and to
ascertain whether the Exchange was adequately carrying out
its responsibilities under the Act.' SRO disciplinary decisions
are appealable to the SRO Board of Directors2 5 and then to
the Commission.26
Commission oversight of Exchange disciplinary proceedings is
more extensive than that of traditional appellate review in that
Section 19(h)(1) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission
by order to suspend for up to twelve months or to revoke the
registration of a self-regulatory organization, or to censure the
2 1 David P. Doherty et. al., The Enforcement Role of the New York Stock Ex-
change, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 637, 644 (1991) [hereinafter Doherty].2
2 Id. at 645.
2 3 Id
' See Provision for Notices by Self-Regulatory Organizations of Disciplinary
Sanctions, Exchange Act Release No. 13,726, [1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 81,225 (July 8, 1977).
' NYSE Rule 476(f).
2r Exchange Act § 19(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (1994).
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SRO or impose limitations upon its activities, functions, and
operations if the Commission, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, finds and states on the record that the self-regulatory
organization has violated or is itself unable to comply with the
Act or the organization's own rules, or has failed to enforce
compliance with relevant laws or rules by a member, associated
person or participant. Similarly, pursuant to Sections 21(e) and
(f) of the Exchange Act, the Commission has the authority to
apply to a federal court for an injunctive order commanding a
self-regulatory organization to enforce compliance by its mem-
bers with the Act, the Commission rules and the organization's
own rules. The Commission thus has the coercive authority to
compel disciplinary action as well as appellate review. The
Commission's ability to compel the commencement of disciplin-
ary action or to compel additional disciplinary action is a pow-
erful tool to be used by the Commission in causing Exchanges
to effect the Commission's enforcement agenda, and has result-
ed in an interactive disciplinary relationship where information
with respect to cases and potential disciplinary actions is
shared between the Commission and the SROs.'
B. Commission Involvement in SRO Rule-Making
By the middle of the 1960s, it became evident that the origi-
nal framework envisioned in 1934 in which the SROs would be
responsible for their own regulation was flawed. A special study
of securities markets conducted by the Commission at the direc-
2' See Vincent L Briccetti, Governmental Action and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 605 (1979); Marianne K.
Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and
the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C.L. REV. 475, 483
(1984). Section 19(h) further authorizes the Commission to remove from office or
censure any officer or director of a self-regulatory organization if the Commis-
sion finds that the officer or director, without reasonable justification or excuse,
has failed to enforce compliance with the relevant laws and the rules under the
Act by any member, associated person or participant. See In the Matter of
Richard Neuberger, Exchange Act Release No. 18,428, [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,091 (January 19, 1982) (finding defendant is
permitted to examine Exchange Department of Enforcement attorney on issue of
whether Exchange was caused or compelled to commence disciplinary action at
the behest of the U.S. Attorney's office). See also Doherty, supra note 21, at 640
(stating that enforcement may also commence an investigation as result of
referrals from the Commission).
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tion of Congress determined that the SROs were not adequately
enforcing their own rules.' For example, the special study
staff submitted a preliminary report which stated, "It]here can
be little doubt that in the case of the American Stock Exchange
the statutory scheme of self-regulation in the public interest
has not worked out in the manner originally envisioned by
Congress.'
By the 1970s, the Commission took an even more critical
view of the then existing regulatory scheme. In a 1971 report,
Commission Chairman Casey stated:
The Commission's present authority over the rulemaking of the
self-regulatory bodies is an illogical patchwork of provisions
which falls short of giving the Commission the authority to act
promptly and effectively where a rule, or a proposed rule, is or
might be injurious to the public interest. ... The Commission
believes that the public interest would be better served if it had
plenary authority with respect to the rules of the self-regulatory
bodies.0
The 1973 Senate Subcommittee on Securities generally
agreed with this analysis, and in 1975, Congress amended the
Exchange Act.3 ' The amendment greatly broadened the
Commission's authority over the SROs, and generally produced
a much more substantial nexus between the Commission and
the SROs. This governmental interrelationship manifests itself
in two distinct areas: (1) the Exchange Aces current require-
ment that all rules adopted by an SRO must be approved by
the Commission before they can become effective, and (2) the
Exchange Act's provision of "plenary powers" to the Commission
to abrogate, add to and delete from existing SRO rules. This
28 See 4 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 751-814 (1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY
REPORT].
29 SEC, STAFF REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION
OF CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (1962), reprinted
in SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, supra note 28, at 53.
SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND
DEALERS, H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1971) (discussing Casey
letter of transmittal).
", Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97,108
(1975).
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authority allows the Commission to directly regulate the activi-
ties of SROs.
Section 19(b) sets forth the procedures for Commission re-
view of SRO rule changes, and provides that no SRO rule
change can become effective unless approved by the Commis-
sion.32 Specifically, the SRO must file copies of its proposed
change with the Commission, accompanied by a description of
the basis and purpose of the proposal. Notice regarding the
substance of the proposed rule change is thereupon provided by
the Commission. By the conclusion of the requisite 35-day com-
ment period, the Commission must either approve the rule
change or it must institute proceedings to evaluate whether the
proposed rule should be disapproved. In the latter case, the
Commission must once again provide both notice of its consider-
ation of the matter and an opportunity for a hearing. Within
180 days, the Commission must reach its final determination.
Section 19(c) describes the procedural requirements for the
exercise of the Commission's plenary powers to abrogate, add to
and delete from SROs' rules,' and was designed to grant the
Commission rulemaking power concerning all SRO rules.' The
Commission must not only notify the affected SRO but it must
also publish notice of the proposal in the Federal Register. The
notice must include the text of the proposed amendment and a
statement concerning the Commission's reasons for initiating
the change. Interested parties are given an opportunity for
written submissions and oral presentations. When the rule is
adopted, the Commission must include a statement explaining
the basis for and purpose of the rule. In addition, the process
must generally comport with the Administrative Procedure Act's
requirements applicable to any governmental rule-making, such
as the content of the notice and the 30-day minimum time
period before such rule can become effective.
This power of the Commission to affect SRO rules is not
exclusive; the Commission still retains its authority to promul-
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1994).
'31& at § 78s(c).
*4 See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1975) ("[With the addition
of Section 19(c),] the SEC would be granted the power to change the rules of a
self-regulatory organization in any respect, not just with respect to certain
enumerated areas.").
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gate its own rules pursuant to the Act.' However, when the
Commission acts pursuant to Section 19(c), the adopted rule
becomes part of the SROs' rules rather than those of the Com-
mission."5
As a result of the current rule-making regime authorized by
Congress, the Commission's relationship and involvement with
the SROs' rule-making process is much more extensive than it
was prior to 1975, and is clearly greater than merely one of
oversight. Not only are the SROs' rules subject to the affirma-
tive approval of the Commission, the Commission also has the
authority to independently change or add to the SROs' own
rules. By subjecting the SROs' rule-making powers to the au-
thority of the Commission, Congress in effect subjected the
SROs to a governance structure which must strictly comport
with federal statutory requirements and the regulatory interests
of the Commission. The highly regulated nature of an entity's
activity (while not determinative) has been an important factor
in existing state action jurisprudence."7 This factor - along
with the close partnership between the Commission and the
SROs, the compulsion for SROs to perform enforcement activi-
ties and the delegation of law enforcement functions to the
SROs - suggests that SROs should be viewed as state actors
when enforcing federal law.
I. STATE ACTION
The state action doctrine rests on important policy interests.
The state action requirement is said to preserve an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and
federal judicial power." Thus, it is said, courts are required to
respect the limits of their own power as directed against the
government and private interests. 9 Private parties are then
free to structure their relations as they wish, "subject only to
the constraints of statutory or decisional law. 40 The doctrine
See i&
15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)(4)(C) (1994).
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1974).
's Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
"9 & at 936-37.
40 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
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also avoids imposing on the State responsibility for conduct for
which it cannot fairly be blamed.4 1
The state action issue is implicit in almost every claim that
a plaintiff has been deprived of constitutionally protected
rights. Theoretically, before a court may address the merits
of such a constitutional claim, the court must first determine
whether there is any governmental action that triggers the
claimed constitutional protection.' In many cases, courts do
not explicitly analyze the issue because state action is clear.
For example, when a federal agency's action is at issue (such as
a Commission regulation) or when a party challenges the con-
stitutionality of a federal or state statute, state action is obvi-
ously present.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on state action derives
from those cases where state action is much less clear. In those
cases, some putatively private actor is the immediate cause of
the complained of harm. It is in those cases where the Court
must address whether governmental authority dominates "an
activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed
to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be
subject to constitutional constraints.""
The state action issue as applied to SRO enforcement of
federal law follows this typical framework. The SRO (a puta-
tively private entity) takes some action that has harmed the
plaintiff, in this case a brokerdealer who is a member of an
Exchange or a person associated with such member firm.'
This Article addresses this issue in the context of a disciplinary
41 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
42 Some constitutional rights, like the Thirteenth Amendments prohibition
against slavery, apply to individuals as well as the government and, therefore,
the state action issue never arises. See U.S. CONST. amend. XMI; The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
' Some commentators have suggested that there is sufficient state action
anytime a court (obviously a state actor) attempts to enforce rights, whether
publicly or privately created. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold
Approach to State Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Broth-
ers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEO L.J. 745, 746 (1981) [hereinafter Rowe]; William W.
Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of
State Action, 1965 DUKE L.J. 219 (1965). The Supreme Court may be moving
toward such an approach. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
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proceeding to enforce federal law against the member or associ-
ated person.' The aggrieved broker-dealer or associated per-
son will claim (either in an injunction proceeding during the
SRO enforcement action47 or in an appeal from the SRO deci-
sion 48) that the Exchange either is denying or has denied it
some constitutionally protected right. The claimed constitutional
right would likely involve due process, self-incrimination or
double jeopardy. The initial question for the court in this sce-
nario is "whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat
that decisive conduct [of the SRO] as state action."49
Judging where the government sphere should end and the
private one should begin, however, has proved to be an elusive
task.0 The Supreme Court has addressed this issue on numer-
ous occasions. Nonetheless, despite the acknowledged impor-
tance of the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court cases
discussing the issue have failed to yield a definitive test for
state action.5 ' Indeed, many commentators consider the
Supreme Court's state action jurisprudence to be a "conceptual
disaster area."52 At least some members of the Court do not
disagree with this assessment.53
Instead of a unitary principle applicable in all state action
cases, the Court has essentially resorted to a case-by-case factu-
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994).
'1 See, e.g., Villani v. New York Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
' See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
49 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
'o See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974)
("Mhe question of whether particular conduct is 'private,' on the one hand, or
'state action,' on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer."); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
51 Compare, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937-39 (1982)
(setting forth a two-part test for state action, while recognizing that 'the Court
has articulated a number of different factors or tests in different contexts. . .)
with San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (failing to apply Lugar test).
52 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term - Forward" "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69,
95 (1967). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 248 (1985)
(arguing state action doctrine is "considerably more consistent and less muddled
than many have long supposed").
' Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 632 (O'Conner, J., dissenting) (stating Supreme
Court decisions regarding state action "have not been a model of consistency.").
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al analysis.' The court has often repeated that "[o]nly by sift-
ing facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious in-
volvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."55 Recently, the Supreme Court has organized this
factual inquiry around two conditions it has found necessary for
a finding of state action. To constitute state action: (1) "the
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,"
and (2) "the party charged with the deprivation must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."56
In the case of SROs enforcing federal law, the first condition
seems to be satisfied by the "rule of conduct" Congress has
imposed on the SROs.57 Under the Exchange Act, SROs are
required to enforce the provisions of the Exchange Act.58
Where the SRO conducts a hearing and determines that such a
violation has occurred, the Exchange Act requires that it im-
pose a penalty against the broker-dealer.59 As a result, when
constitutional rights are denied in an SRO disciplinary proceed-
ing, the broker-dealer's injury derives directly from the rule of
conduct the Exchange Act imposes on the SRO.
The second part of the analysis is not as simple. In deter-
mining whether a private party can fairly be described as a
state actor, the Supreme Court applies the facts of a given case
to "certain principles of general application" that it has devel-
oped in its state action cases.60 These general principles are
essentially categories of state action. Under its current mode of
analysis, if the Court finds that the challenged activity falls
within one of these categories, then it will find that state action
exists. For example, state action will be found if the govern-
ment has coerced or encouraged the private actor to engage in
54 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
I&L; see Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
56 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50-51
(1992); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
' See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 941 (holding scheme created by statute
satisfied first prong of test).
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(bX1) (1994) and discussion infra Section IV.
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(6) (1994).
60 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621.
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the complained of activity. 1 Likewise, if a private actor is per-
forming certain delegated "public functions" it will be subject to
constitutional restrictions.62 Although focusing on somewhat
different facts, both of these tests address the essential question
of whether the government is responsible in some way for the
conduct of which plaintiff complains.' In other words, consti-
tutional "liability attaches only to those wrongdoers 'who carry
a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capa-
city.'"6 As discussed below, under both the "coercion/encourage-
ment" test and the "public function7 test, the SROs, when en-
forcing federal law, should be considered state actors.
A. The Coercion or Encouragement Test
Merely because the government has some connection with the
actions of a private entity does not mean those actions will be
considered state actions. Extensive regulation of a private actor
does not, in and of itself, transform the actions of the regulated
entity into those of the government.' Thus, even though the
Commission has extensive authority with respect to SRO
rule-making, this alone does not convert SRO activity into state
action. Likewise, mere approval of, or acquiescence in, a private
party's initiatives is typically insufficient to establish state
action." However, these factors do not describe the entire re-
lationship between the Commission and the SROs.
What is required (and, what exists with respect to SROs) is
a showing that the State is specifically responsible for the par-
ticular activity of which the plaintiff complains.6 7 Such respon-
sibility is shown where the government "has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
81 See discussion infra Section I.A
e See discussion infra Section HI.B.
' Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 632
(O'Conner, J., dissenting).
"NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (quoting Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)). See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 632 (O'Conner, J., dis-
senting).
' See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 350 (1974).
' Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05.
6 Id at 1004.
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overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the [government]."' Such coercion will exist where a
private actor is commanded to perform the complained of ac-
tions in a statutory or regulatory scheme.69 That situation
does not involve mere approval or acquiescence; rather, it is the
State which is ultimately the responsible actor because the
State has "put its own weight on the side of the proposed prac-
tice by ordering it." 70 Fairness requires that the State be held
responsible when it has ordered or significantly encouraged
private parties to impair the important rights of others.71
The Court discussed these issues in some depth in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co."2 In Jackson, a customer brought suit
against a privately owned and operated utility seeking damages
under the Civil Rights Act73 for termination of her electric ser-
vice, allegedly before she was afforded notice, a hearing and the
opportunity to pay any amounts found due. Under a provision
of the utility's general tariff filed with the State, the utility had
the right to discontinue service to any customer on reasonable
notice of nonpayment of bills. Plaintiff argued, in part, that the
utility's monopoly status and the State's approval of the util-
ity's general tariff created state action. 4
The Court acknowledged that determining whether state
action exists in any particular case "frequently admits of no
easy answer."75 The Court was clear that State regulation of a
business, even if that regulation is extensive and detailed, does
not by itself convert private action into that of the State.
76
Nonetheless, the Court did not completely reject the relevance
' San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 546 (quoting Blum, 457
U.S. at 1004); Rendell-Baker v. Kobn, 457 U.S. 830, 810 (1982).
69 Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.) ("State action would be similarly
present here with respect to all the students if New York had undertaken to set
policy for the control of demonstrations in all private universities....").0 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
71 See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963).
72 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
73 Pub. L. No. 96-170, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
7" Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 354-55.
71 Id at 350 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723
(1961); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972)).76 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350.
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of extensive regulation. Instead, it held that those and other
factors were part of a larger inquiry:
It may well be that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at
least something of a governmentally protected monopoly will
more readily be found to be 'state' acts than will be the acts of
an entity lacking these characteristics. But the inquiry must be
whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.
Such an inquiry will often be "detailed" because the true
nature of the State's involvement may not be immediately obvi-
ous." In our context, the intimate relationship between SROs
and the Commission, as manifested through both the rule-
making process and the existence of interactive enforcement
activity, is an important factor that helps establish that SRO
action can be fairly treated as that of the State.
In Jackson, however, the Court found no such nexus." In
particular, the Court "reject[ed] the notion that Metropolitans
termination is state action because the State 'has specifically
authorized and approved' the termination practice."'m The
Court down-played the significance of the fact that the utility
was required to file its general tariff (which contained the ter-
mination provision at issue) with the State." That provision
had never been the subject of a hearing or other scrutiny by
the State. Moreover, the Court questioned whether the State
legitimately would have had the power to disapprove it. For
these reasons the Court found that the case did not concern an:
imprimatur placed on the practice of Metropolitan about which
petitioner complains. The nature of the governmental regulation
of private utilities is such that a utility may frequently be re-
quired by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for
77 I& at 350-51 (citations omitted).
78 Id at 350.
7
"
9 The Court did not consider whether all of the factors taken together
supported a finding of state action, even though each factor was insufficient in
and of itself. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 140-41
(1975) (criticizing seriatim approach).
'0 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354.
8' See id at 354-55.
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practices a business regulated in less detail would be free to
institute without any approval from a regulatory body. Approval
by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated
utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the
side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a
practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission
into "state action." At most, the Commission's failure to overturn
this practice amounted to no more than a determination that a
Pennsylvania utility was authorized to employ such a practice if
it so desired. Respondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state
law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State,
does not make its action in doing so "state action" for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'3
In Jackson, unlike in the case of SROs, there was no statute
ordering the supposedly private entity to engage in the com-
plained of activity. The State did not order Metropolitan Edison
to cut off Ms. Jackson's power. The Jackson Court thus distin-
guished between State acceptance and State commandment. It
is not enough for a finding of state action if the private action
at issue results from private initiative and occurs merely be-
cause the State has not armatively prohibited it.' Such tac-
it acceptance does not implicate constitutional concerns.
The decision in Albert v. Carovano8" demonstrates the same
distinction. In Albert, Hamilton College and certain of its offi-
cers were sued by students who claimed that the college's filing
of certain disciplinary rules and regulations pursuant to the
Henderson Act' constituted "a rule of conduct imposed by the
State"8 that rendered the college a state actor in connection
with its disciplinary actions. The Second Circuit found, howev-
er, that since the Henderson Act did not require any specific
disciplinary action and because the State's only role was to
keep such rules and regulations on file, the finding of state
action was not justified. By contrast, if a private actor is regu-
lated and those regulations provide that an actor is explicitly
required to perform certain functions or engage in certain activ-
8 Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
83 See iU
8 51 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988).
"s N.Y. Educ. Law § 6450 (McKinney 1985).
8 Albert, 851 F.2d at 568 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982)).
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ities, then a "sufficiently close nexus" is created to find state
action.87 In that case, the State has taken the "initiative" by
"ordering" the private actor to engage in the complained of
activity.' It is that situation (typified by the Exchange Act's
treatment of SROs) which gives rise to state action and consti-
tutional protections.
The Supreme Court highlighted this distinction between
acquiescence and commandment in Magg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks. 9 In Flagg Bros., the Court determined that a private
warehouseman's sale of goods as a remedy for unpaid storage
fees did not involve state action, even though such sales were
permitted under New York's Uniform Commercial Code. The
Court found no state action because the statute in question
only permitted the remedy under certain circumstances, it did
not compel the warehouseman to exercise that remedy."0 In es-
sence, the statute was nothing more than an indication of state
"inaction," that is, an indication that the State would not inter-
fere with private self-help remedies to the extent that they
conformed to the statutory requirements.9 The "State is re-
sponsible for the ... act of a private party when the State, by
its law, has compelled the act."92
In reaching this result, the Flagg Bros. Court relied not only
on Jackson but also on Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 3 In
Moose Lodge, plaintiff, an African-American, brought suit under
the Civil Rights Act after he was refused service by Moose
Lodge, a local branch of a private fraternal organization located
in Pennsylvania." Plaintiff claimed that because the Pennsyl-
vania liquor board had issued Moose Lodge a license that au-
thorized the sale of alcoholic beverages, the refusal to serve him
was state action.9 5 As in its later cases, the Court in Moose
Lodge held that the mere existence of pervasive regulation was
87 See id.; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
8 Albert, 851 F.2d at 568.
89 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978).
90 Id. at 165-66.
91 Id. at 164-66.
0Id at 164 (quoting Adickes v. S.-L Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170
(1970)).
93 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
94 Id. at 164-65.
9 Id- at 165.
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not enough to create state action.9" The State's regulations did
not encourage racial discrimination. In that situation, "where
the impetus for the discrimination is private" there will be no
finding of state action unless the State "significantly involved
itself with the invidious discriminations."97
The Court in Moose Lodge did, however, find state action
with respect to a liquor board regulation requiring that "[elvery
club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of its Consti-
tution and ByLaws." 98 Moose Lodge's constitution required
racial discrimination. Even though the State regulation was
"neutral in its terms, the result of its application in a case
where the constitution and bylaws of a club required racial
discrimination would be to invoke the sanctions of the State to
enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule."99 As in
Jackson and Flagg Bros., in order to find state action the
Moose Lodge Court also required that the State put its weight
on the side of a particular practice by ordering it.00
The Supreme Court found coercion sufficient for state action
to exist in Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, ' a case
which is particularly relevant to the determination that SROs
are state actors. Both situations involve the State ordering
private actors to perform specified functions. Skinner concerned
the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,102 which authorized
the Secretary of Transportation to "prescribe, as necessary,
appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all
areas of railroad safety.""° The Federal Railroad Administra-
tion (the "FRA") determined that alcohol and drug abuse by
railroad employees posed a serious threat to safety. Pursuant to
its statutory authority under the Railroad Safety Act, the FRA
promulgated regulations that mandated blood and urine tests of
96 Id at 173, 176-77. See Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
1993).
9 Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
380 (1967)).
' Id. at 177 (quoting Regulations of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
§ 113.09 (June 1970 ed.)).
9 Id. at 178-79.
100 Id. at 172-73; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
(1974); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
101 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
1 84 Stat. 971, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1988).
" Id. at § 431(a).
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employees who were involved in certain train accidents."°4
The FRA also adopted regulations that authorized, but did not
require, the railroads to administer breath and urine tests to
employees who violated certain safety rules. 1° 5 The state ac-
tion question presented in the case was whether these regula-
tions implicated the Fourth Amendment, given that the rail-
roads who were actually administering the tests were theoreti-
cally private parties."°
The Court found that state action existed when a railroad
performed the mandatory tests prescribed in the FRA regula-
tions. These regulations amounted to "compulsion of sovereign
authority" and implicated the Fourth Amendment."°  Like-
wise, the Court found that the regulations authorizing the rail-
roads to perform breath and urine tests after certain safety
violations had occurred also implicated the Fourth Amendment.
"Whether a private party should be deemed an agent or instru-
ment of the Government ... necessarily turns on the degree of
the Government's participation in the private party's activi-
ties."' In Skinner, the content of the regulations made plain
that the searches were not the "result of private initiative.""
The government had clearly indicated in the relevant regula-
tions "not only its strong preference for iesting, but also its
desire to share the fiaits of such intrusions." This encourage-
ment, endorsement and participation in the private activity
created state action.110
Similarly, in Little v. Streater," the Supreme Court re-
viewed a Connecticut statute which provided that in paternity
actions the cost of blood grouping tests was to be borne by the
party requesting them. The Court was asked whether the stat-
ute violated the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to deny
such tests to indigent defendants." The plaintiff in the ac-
104 IdL
1051C
"0 Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) ("The
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary
one, effected by a private party on his own initiative.. .. ).
107 Id.
108Ic
109 I& at 615.
110 Id at 615-16.
"" 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
2 Id. at 3.
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tion was the unmarried mother of a child who, as a condition
stemming from her child's receipt of public assistance, was re-
quired to identify the child's father."' The Connecticut
Department of Social Services provided the mother with an
attorney to bring a paternity suit against the alleged father to
establish his liability for the child's support."" The father's
legal aid attorney moved the trial court to order blood grouping
tests on the mother and child and, because the father was
indigent, to order the State to pay for the tests."1 The trial
court granted the father's request for the tests, but denied the
request that the State pay for them.116 The tests were not
performed, allegedly because the father could not afford to have
them done. The father then lost the paternity suit and ap-
pealed.
The father argued that "unlike a common dispute between
private parties, the State's involvement in this paternity pro-
ceeding was considerable and manifest, giving rise to a consti-
tutional duty.""7 The Supreme Court agreed, finding that
state action had "undeniably pervaded" the case."' State ac-
tion derived from Connecticut's statutory scheme of public assis-
tance. As a recipient of public support, Connecticut had com-
pelled the mother "to disclose the name of the putative father
under oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity
of the said child."" In other words, just like the SRO, a stat-
ute required a supposedly private party to enforce the require-
ments of a statutory scheme against a private party. In both
cases, the State used a potent threat to assure compliance with
113 Id
114 Id-
"5 Id. at 3-4.
116 Id at 4.
17 Id- at 9.
118 Id.
19 Id (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-169 (1981)).
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its edict. That State compulsion" ° sets these cases apart from
"ordinary civil litigation between private parties."'
State commandment through statutory enactment is such a
strong basis for finding state action that a court is likely to
find state action even if the private actor would have taken the
same action independently of the existence of the statute. In
Peterson v. Greenville,'22 ten African-Americans were arrested
for trespass after participating in a sit-in at a department store
lunch counter in Greenville, South Carolina. Prior to their ar-
rest, the manager of the store had asked the protesters to leave
because integrated service was "contrary to local customs" and
in violation of a Greenville city ordinance requiring segregation
in restaurants? 3
The Supreme Court found that the existence of the city ordi-
nance was sufficient to find state action even if the private
actor "would have acted as he did independently of the exis-
tence of the ordinance."' 4 By enacting the ordinance, the
State had reserved for itself the decision as to whether restau-
rants would be operated on a segregated basis.? The Court
held that:
When the State has commanded a particular result, it has saved
to itself the power to determine that result and thereby "to a
significant extent" has "become involved" in it, in fact, has re-
moved that decision from the sphere of private choice. It has
thus effectively determined that a person owning, managing or
controlling an eating place is left with no choice of his own but
must segregate his white and Negro patrons. The [store] manage-
'2 The Court also relied on the following factors: (i) the State's Attorney
General automatically became a party to the action; (ii) any settlement agree-
ment required the approval of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of
Human Resources or the Commissioner of Income Maintenance; (iii) the State
referred the paternity suit to a lawyer and paid his fees; and (iv) the State was
to receive the monthly support payments. I& These factors support a finding
that the mother and state were joint actors, possibly a separate basis for estab-
lishing state action apart from the state coercion ground. See Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961).
1 Little, 452 U.S. at 9-10.
m2 373 U.S. 244, 245 (1963).
123 1& at 246.
U4 Id- at 248.
m Id- at 247-48.
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ment, in deciding to exclude Negroes, did precisely what the city
law required.'
The State commandment thus overwhelmed the question of
private choice such that the private actor's actions, whatever
their motivation, would be deemed that of the State.' 7
The enforcement of federal law by SROs falls neatly into
those cases finding state action as a result of statutory com-
mandments. Clearly, SROs are heavily regulated. Pursuant to
the Exchange Act, their organization and operations are subject
to statutory requirements and substantial Commission oversight
and approval. However, SROs enforcing federal law are not
merely another heavily regulated entity;'m instead, they are
entities that have been ordered to perform a particular function
- to enforce the Exchange Act. The SROs did not take the
initiative in instituting that function. Rather, it was the govern-
ment that "has put its weight on the side of the proposed prac-
tice by ordering it. "'
The Exchange Act compels a particular result - it requires
the SROs, as a condition of their continued existence, to enforce
compliance by their members with provisions of the Exchange
Act and with the rules and regulations promulgated there-
under.' Like the mother in Little v. Streater, the SRO must
bring actions against private parties. 1 ' This statutory man-
date is strictly enforced pursuant to Sections 19(h) and 21(e)
which require the Commission to sanction SROs and their offi-
cials if they fail to properly enforce federal law through the
disciplinary process. The Commission can go so far as to seek
an injunction requiring appropriate disciplinary action. Usually,
the informal interaction between the Commission and the SROs
is sufficient to obtain appropriate enforcement activity; but,
clearly the coercive impact of Sections 19(h) and 21(e) are suffi-
cient to compel enforcement of federal law.
12 Id. at 248.
'" See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987).
r See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354-55 (1974).
'o 15 U.S.C. § 78f(bXl) (1994).
13 See Litle, 452 U.S. at 3-4.
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Indeed, the SROs are in no different position than the rail-
road companies in Skinner that were required to perform drug
tests on their employees. 2 In fact, it can be argued that the
coercion of the Commission exercised pursuant to the Exchange
Act is greater than that exercised by FRA in Skinner. As in
Skinner, the legal scheme imposed by the federal government
requires the so-called private actor to engage in specified activi-
ties - drug testing in Skinner, enforcement of federal securities
laws in the SRO context. But, under the Exchange Act, the
SROs are not only required to ferret out violations of federal
law, they are also required to punish the violators. Both legal
schemes amount to "compulsion of sovereign authority" and
implicate constitutional protections.'
This compulsion distinguishes the SROs acting pursuant to
the requirements of the Exchange Act from the private ware-
houseman in Flagg Bros. In Flagg Bros., the Court made plain
the fact that the State had not "compelled the sale of the bail-
or's goods."' The Uniform Commercial Code merely gave the
bailor a mechanism, which it could use or ignore.' The
SROs have no such choice; they must enforce federal law or
risk being put out of business.
That threat is not an idle one. In fact, in 1966 pursuant to
Section 19(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, the Commission withdrew
the registration of the San Francisco Mining Exchange, a na-
tional securities exchange, as a result of its failure to enforce
compliance with various sections of the Exchange Act. This
drastic sanction was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in San Francisco Mining Exchange v. Securities
and Exchange Commission"6 and provides clear evidence of
the Commission's power to coerce the SROs to enforce federal
law.
For these reasons, the SROs should be considered state ac-
tors when they are enforcing federal law. By enacting the Ex-
change Act, Congress has removed from the private sphere the
decision whether the SROs should act to punish violations of
- See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
See i&L
'34 Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 165.
'm See i&
'6 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967).
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federal law. 7 Congress has "effectively determined" that an
SRO has "no choice" but to do so."5 In all such cases, state
action exists and constitutional safeguards should come into
play.
It is no response to argue, as the court in United States v.
Solomon" 9 suggested, that the Exchange Act does not turn
securities exchanges into state actors because "this is but one of
many instances where government relies on self-policing by
private organizations to effectuate the purposes underlying
federal regulating statutes."14° As a preliminary matter, the
self-regulatory model used in securities and commodities regula-
tion is unique in the extent to which self-regulation is
used.'4' Moreover, even to the extent the relationship is not
unique, that fact alone does not explain why State coercion
does not amount to state action.
State coercion thus provides a basis for finding state action
on the part of SROs enforcing federal law.
B. The Public Function Test
Like other aspects of state action jurisprudence, the public
function concept has a long and variegated history in Supreme
Court cases. The essential principle is easily stated. If a private
actor is engaged in inherently governmental functions, or if the
government delegates the operation of one of its traditional and
quintessential functions to a private actor, then the private
actor will be deemed to be a state actor subject to constitution-
al limitations.14
"'See Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963).
See id.
'39 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
140 Id. at 869.
.See Sam S. Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 853, 853 n.1 (1985); SEC REPORT, supra
note 17.
142 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195 (1988); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) ("[When
private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or func-
tions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the
State and subject to its constitutional limitations."); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
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The rationale for the doctrine is equally clear. "The fact that
the government delegates some portion of [its] power to private
[actors] does not change the governmental character of the
power exercised."' Without the public function doctrine, the
government could circumvent constitutional proscriptions on its
power merely by delegating important governmental functions
to theoretically private entities.' The public function doc-
trine thus requires the courts to look behind the State's deci-
sion to provide such services through a private entity.145 Be-
cause the State cannot be allowed to shed so easily its constitu-
tional limitations, the private actor functions as a sort of sub-
stitute State.' In a very real sense, the private actor, when
performing a public function, becomes an agent of the
State.1
47
Despite its seeming simplicity, the doctrine has been difficult
to apply. It has narrowed and broadened considerably since its
initial appearance in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court's
struggle with the doctrine has been definitional - which gov-
ernment functions are "so intimately associated with our con-
cept of sovereignty that the state ought not be permitted to
authorize [their] exercise by a private party without the same
degree of protection that would apply if the sovereign itself
were conducting [the function?] " '
The cases addressing this issue not only fail to define the
exact contours of the doctrine, they are also nearly impossible
to reconcile with each other.149 This inconsistency has made
predicting which governmental functions will be considered to
fall within the scope of "public functions" difficult. Nonetheless,
even under the Supreme Court's narrowest conception, an SRO
1 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991).
144 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356-57 (1992). See The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, supra note 79, at 150-51 (1975).
145 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 Rowe, supra note 43, at 757.
'4 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
14 The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 128 (1978). Some
prominent commentators condemn this as a fruitless inquiry. See Glennon and
Nowak, supra note 5, at 232 (claiming public function doctrine is "hollow");
TRIBE, supra note 5, § 18-5 at 1706 ("[N]o satisfactory criteria currently exist to
determine what is or is not inherently governmental for this purpose.").
14 Compare Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1978) with
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-20 (1991).
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enforcing federal law is exercising a delegated public function
subject to constitutional limitations.150
To demonstrate this point, it is necessary to examine some of
the Court's more prominent public function cases. In its early
incarnation, the Court determined that if a private actor was
performing all of the functions of a sovereign, then it must be
considered a state actor. For example, in Marsh v.
Alabama,' the Supreme Court used the public function doc-
trine to prevent the owner of a company town from prohibiting
a religious group from distributing leaflets in the town's busi-
ness district. The Court took the view that in those situations
where private property has taken on "all the characteristics of
[a] town" and the private actor is performing all the necessary
municipal functions, then the private actor will have taken on
the mantle of the State and will be subject to the same consti-
tutional restrictions as the State.'52 In other cases, the Court
overturned lower court decisions that permitted the use of puta-
tively private entities as a mechanism to exclude
African-Americans from participating in primary elections in
Texas. 1'
In the 1970s, the Court significantly narrowed the delegated
public function concept in two opinions authored by then Jus-
tice Rehnquist.' The first of those cases was Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.'iR In addition to arguing that the
heavy regulation of the utility and its monopoly status created
state action, the customer who had her electric service termi-
nated in that case claimed that under state law she had an
entitlement to reasonably continuous electrical service to her
home. She argued that the utility's termination of her service
for alleged nonpayment constituted "state action" depriving her
of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
'5 See U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, § 3 (stating enforcement of federal law is a
power delegated to the Executive branch of the federal government); see also
TRIBE, supra note 5, at § 4-11 (discussing Executive branch duties of law en-
forcement).
151 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
152 Id at 502.
1 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
'4 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
m 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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tee of due process of law because of the importance of electrical
service.
The Court was not persuaded by this argument. It was not
enough that the utility provided an essential public service or
that its activity was "affected with the public interest."1 In
rejecting these claims, the Court narrowed the scope of the
public functions test. Instead of encompassing all "traditional"
government functions, the Court now held that public functions
were only those "exclusively" reserved to the State." The util-
ity was not performing a public function in Jackson because the
State was not obligated to provide utility services to its citi-
zens. 5 s Since private companies had historically provided
such services, the Court took the view that supplying such
services "is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State .... ."19 It is only where a private entity exercises pow-
ers traditionally and exclusively reserved to the government
that state action is present.
Four years later, the Court once again focused on the exclu-
sivity requirement in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks.6" In Flagg
Bros., the Court examined the state action requirement in the
context of the sale of goods by a private warehouseman for
nonpayment of fees. No state officials were involved in the sale.
Rather, New York State allowed private sales as part of its
Uniform Commercial Code.1 6 ' In support of her claim that the
sale violated her due process and equal protection rights, re-
spondent contended that New York had delegated to Flagg
Brothers a traditional function exclusively reserved to the State
- the power to resolve private disputes.'62 The Court dis-
agreed, finding no state action.
G Jackson, 419 U.S. at 620. See also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
842 (1982).
'5 See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (citing Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)
(election); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (election); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
(municipal park)).
m Jackson, 419 U.S. at 620.
'9 Id This view became clear in later cases. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 2770-72.
160 436 U.S. 149 (1976).
161 Id at 151-52 (citing New York U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964)).
162 I& at 157.
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In so holding, the Court once again focused on the "exclusivi-
ty" requirement of public functions. It held that "[w]hile many
functions have been traditionally performed by governments,
very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State."'6 The
Court noted that traditionally private arrangements played an
important part in ordering relationships in the commercial
world.' As a result, the Court found that "the settlement of
disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an
exclusive public function."1" According to the Court, this re-
sult was clear from its earlier cases, where only private actors
who performed all of the functions of the sovereign 16 or who
performed such exclusive functions as conducting elections
16
were state actors.
The Court, however, did not limit public functions to those it
had found to exist in its previous cases. Instead, it indicated
that:
[W]e would be remiss if we did not note that there are a number
of state and municipal functions not covered by our election cases
or governed by the reasoning of Marsh which have been adminis-
tered with a greater degree of exclusivity by States and munici-
palities than has the function of so-called "dispute resolution."
Among these are such functions as education, fire and police
protection, and tax collection. We express no view as to the ex-
tent, if any, to which a city or State might be free to delegate to
private parties the performance of such functions and thereby
avoid the strictures of the [Constitution]. 16
After Jackson and Flagg Bros., it seemed clear that it was
not enough that a public function could be performed by the
State. Apparently, only those activities or functions that are
traditionally associated with the government, and are operated
almost exclusively by the government, are state actions.'69
1' Id. at 158 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
352 (1974)).64 1d. at 160.
16 1d. at 161.
16 Id. at 158-162 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
167 Id (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)).
'sId. at 163-64.
169 See id.
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Thus, after Flagg Bros., the Court found that neither the provi-
sion of education to troubled high school students' nor the
operation of nursing homes' were exclusive public fimctions.
The Court in West v. Atkins 72 did, however, find that a phy-
sician who is under contract with the State to provide medical
services to inmates at a state prison on a part-time basis was a
state actor when he treated an inmate. There, the Court rea-
soned that the doctor in a collaborative effort with the hospital
staff was fulfilling the State's obligation to provide adequate
medical care under the Eighth Amendment to incarcerated
persons and thus that he was fulfilling a constitutionally man-
dated obligation.
We now make explicit what was implicit in our holding in
Estelle: Respondent, as a physician employed by North Carolina
to provide medical services to state prison inmates, acted under
color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when undertaking his
duties in treating petitioner's injury. Such conduct is fairly at-
tributable to the State.173
Even under the strict view of the public function doctrine
evidenced by Jackson and Flagg, SROs enforcing federal law
under the Exchange Act are state actors. Like the doctor in
West, SROs are engaged in a collaborative effort with the Com-
mission; indeed, that relationship has been poignantly described
by the Supreme Court as a "partnership."'74 That partnership
requires the SRO to perform a law enforcement function pur-
suant to explicit federal statutory delegation."15 Congress has
delegated the power and responsibility to enforce the federal
securities laws to the SROs. In a sense, Congress has deputized
the SROs, giving them "a badge of authority of a state."176
The SROs, as a condition for their continued existence, are
required to seek out 'and investigate such violations." More-
over, not only do the SROs conduct enforcement functions, they
170 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
"" Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982).
172 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
113 Id at 54.
174 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963).
175 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994).
176 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
177 See id,
No. 2:453]
also are required to levy fines and other punishments against
those they find have violated federal law. Thus, Congress has
also delegated investigatory and adjudicatory functions to the
SROs.
These functions are intimately associated with our concept of
the sovereign. 78 Indeed, they are within the traditional and
exclusive public functions contemplated in the Supreme Court's
public function cases. For example, even in Flagg, the Supreme
Court's narrowest conception of the public function doctrine, the
Court intimated that a private party might be a state actor
when exercising power delegated by the State to provide police
protection. 79 Likewise, the enforcement of federal law, and
the imposition of penalties (especially penalties not available in
civil litigation) for such violations, are quintessential govern-
ment functions.8 A finding of state action is bolstered by the
interactive disciplinary relationship that exists between the
Commission and the SROs. The sharing of information with
respect to cases and potential disciplinary proceedings demon-
strates the existence of a partnership to perform the law en-
forcement function.
The fact that Exchanges existed prior to the adoption of the
Exchange Act, and therefore have a long history of enforcing
rules against their members, does not alter this result. That
history does not support a finding that the SROs are currently
exercising a non-exclusive public function. While it is true that
oversight of the Exchanges has not rested exclusively with the
State, enforcing private rules is an altogether different activity
from enforcing federal law at the demand and under the direct
supervision of the federal government. The requirement that
the SRO enforce federal law means that this is not a situation
that involves merely the resolution of private disputes. 8 ' The
federal government has undertaken to police the Exchanges, by
enacting the Exchange Act and by creating the Commission.
Congress then required the Exchanges to enforce the Exchange
178 See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 79, at 128.
"'79FIgg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163.
m Cf NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195-96 (1988) (holding no state
action because state did not delegate any power to take specific action against
private individuals).
18' See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157.
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Act." 2 Both Congress and the Commission have recognized
that this statutory scheme delegated governmental power to the
SROs.' 3 It is that delegation of governmental enforcement
authority that, for limited purposes, turned the formerly private
Exchanges into state actors.
One SRO, the NASD, has even argued that in certain in-
stances it should be treated as if it were the government be-
cause of the law enforcement powers it exercises. Ross v.
Bolton' concerned a civil action arising out of defendants'
alleged wrongdoing in connection with certain over-the-counter
trading. The NASD had conducted its own investigation of the
relevant events during which it had obtained the testimony of
several witnesses. Defendants subpoenaed the NASD (a
non-party to the suit) seeking production of transcripts of the
witnesses' statements. The NASD refused to comply with the
subpoenas.
On the ensuing motion to compel, the NASD argued that it
was quasi-governmental and was thus privileged from having to
produce the documents. The NASD argued that it did not have
to turn over its records "on the grounds that its law enforce-
ment duties make it a quasi-governmental agency and that, as
a result, its investigative files are entitled to the same privilege
against discovery as that afforded to a governmental investiga-
tive body."' Although the court did not decide whether that
characterization was correct," it is significant that the
NASD argued that when it is exercising its law enforcement
functions, it is acting as a governmental body. This is exactly
the type of activity the public function concept was designed to
capture.
Application of the state actor doctrine in such circumstances
also avoids the inconsistent results that can occur when federal
law is enforced by the Commission with constitutional restric-
tions and protections, and enforced by an SRO "subject to com-
, See id. at 164.
' Note, Governmental Action and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 595 (1979).
1 106 F.R.D. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
I at 315-16.
The court held that NASD members are "contractually bound" to release
any information requested by the NASD, thus no "chilling effect" would result
by allowing discovery into NASD files. Id at 316.
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prehensive Commission oversight"m 7 without any such restric-.
tions or protections.
IV. EXISTING LOWER COURT DECISIONS
A perusal of the lower court cases discussing whether SROs
are state actors indicates the following: (1) several federal court
cases have held that SROs are state actors when they engage
in enforcement proceedings;' (2) no federal court cases have
held that any constitutional rights other than due process
rights apply in connection with enforcement actions instituted
by SROs; and (3) courts have not been careful to draw a dis-
tinction between an SRO acting in its general capacity and an
SRO acting in its capacity as the enforcer of federal law pursu-
ant to mandated responsibilities under the Exchange Act.
A. SROs As State Actors for Purposes of Due Process
In Intercontinental Industries, Inc. v. American Stock
Exchange,"5 9 Intercontinental Industries, Inc. ("ICI") sued the
American Stock Exchange ("AMEX") and the Commission seek-
ing to set aside a Commission order allowing the AMEX to
delist ICI stock. The AMEX applied the rules that allow it to
delist securities if the AMEX determines that a listed corpora-
tion has disseminated inaccurate information concerning corpo-
rate developments. ICI claimed that when recommending to
delist a stock, the AMEX is required to provide adequate proce-
' Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent, at 4,
Gabriel v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, No. 94-4208 (2d Cir. filed March 27,
1995).
See Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935,
941 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that AMEX is a state actor); United States v. Sloan,
388 F. Supp. 1062, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that the proper remedy for
dismissal by the NYSE for claiming a Fifth Amendment privilege is a suit for
denial of due process) a prerequisite of which is a determination that the NYSE
is a state actor, Villani v. New York Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (stating that NYSE is bound by due process requirements of
Fifth Amendment), affd sub nom Sloan v. New York Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1
(2nd Cir. 1973); Crimmins v. American Stock Exch., 346 F. Supp. 1256, 1259
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1184, 1188
(W.D. Tex. 1970) (stating that NASD is a state actor).
m 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971).
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dural protections pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution. To resolve this issue, the court first needed to deter-
mine whether the Exchange was a state actor.
The Intercontinental court applied the standard enunciated in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority" to determine that
the AMEX was a state actor.' 19 Burton had held that private
actions may be deemed governmental action when the govern-
ment "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [a private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity."9 2 The state actor test
employed by Burton is fact intensive. The court in
Intercontinental considered not only the extensive regulation of
Exchanges, but also the fact that Exchanges are required to
register with the Commission, submit rules for approval by the
Commission, and enforce federal securities laws - all under a
potential penalty of suspension of registration if such responsi-
bilities are not completed by the Exchange.
The Intercontinental court concluded that "the intimate in-
volvement of the [AMEX] with the Securities and Exchange
Commission brings it within the purview of the Fifth Amend-
ment controls over governmental due process."'9 The court
further held that the AMEX had satisfied applicable constitu-
tional due process concerns.'
Several cases have followed the conclusion reached in
Intercontinental.95  None of these cases, including
Intercontinental, identified the distinction between disciplinary
proceedings involving enforcement of SROs' rules as opposed to
disciplinary proceedings involving enforcement of the Exchange
Act. Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange directly followed the
holding of Intercontinental."6 In Crimmins, a broker-dealer
charged with churning customers' accounts sought an injunction
to prevent the AMEX from holding a disciplinary hearing with-
1"0 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
19 Intercontinental, 452 F.2d at 941.
Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
Intercontinental, 452 F.2d at 941.
194 Id at 943.
1 See supra note 186.
' 346 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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out allowing him to be represented by counsel. 97 The Court
stated:
"[Tihe day is long gone when a national stock exchange can be
considered a private club when it conducts disciplinary proceed-
ings against its members or their employees. When an exchange
conducts such proceedings under the self-regulatory powers con-
ferred upon it by the [Exchange] Act, it is engaged in govern-
mental action, federal in character, and the [Exchange] Act im-
posed upon it the requirement that it comply with fundamental
standards of fair play."9
Although the court held that the Fifth Amendment applied
because of the "governmental impairment of a private inter-
est,"' the failure to provide counsel in Crimmins was
deemed not to be violative of due process. 00
Villani v. New York Stock Exchange also followed
Intercontinental and held that the New York Stock Exchange
(the "NYSE") was a state actor when it conducted disciplinary
hearings pursuant to the Exchange Act.20 1 In Villani, two part-
ners in a member firm of the NYSE sought an injunction
against the NYSE: (1) to allow them to have representation by
counsel in disciplinary hearings; (2) to provide them with access
to certain documents; and (3) to prevent the NYSE from bring-
ing disciplinary charges simultaneously with a civil action being
brought against their firm.02 The Court stated that "[ilt is
now beyond dispute that the Fifth Amendment due process re-
quirements as to federal action apply to disciplinary hearings
conducted by the Exchange. Such hearings are conducted under
the self-regulatory power conferred upon it by a federal agency,
the Securities and Exchange Commission.""' The
17Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1259 (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)).
I. (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961)).
20 i&
201 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd sub. nom. Sloan v.
New York Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1188.
' 0 Id. at 1188 n.1. For authority that SROs are bound by the due process
protections of the Fifth Amendment, both Crimmins and Villani rely on Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364 (1963). Although that case held
that the NYSE was obligated to provide certain procedural protections, the
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Intercontinental line of cases address but do not directly ana-
lyze the fact that the due process requirements discussed there-
in are specifically afforded pursuant to the Exchange Act. More
specifically, each of the decisions following Intercontinental
could be justified based upon Section 6(b)(7) of the Exchange
Act which requires that the rules of an Exchange must, in
general, provide fair procedures with respect to discipline of
members. Section 6, as discussed herein, provides that in disci-
plinary proceedings the Exchange must provide at least the
basics of due process including bringing specific charges, provid-
ing defendants the opportunity to defend against the charges,
maintaining a record of the proceedings and supporting the
sanctions by indicating the acts or practices in which the mem-
ber or associated person engaged. These cases do not address
the more complicated issues of whether other constitutional
protections are implicated, including the privilege against
Crimmins and Villani courts' reliance on it extends the narrow holding in
Silver. In Silver, the plaintiff, a non-member of the NYSE, sued the NYSE for
forcing member firms to disconnect direct-wire telephone connections with the
plaintiff without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence as to
why such service should be maintained. Silver, 373 U.S. at 361. The Court
determined that, at a minimum, the NYSE was obligated to provide the plain-
tiff with notice and an opportunity to be heard, ie., basic due process protec-
tions. I& at 361. The Court did not reach this decision by deciding that the
NYSE was a state actor subject to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, but
instead by applying the Sherman Act. Id The Court stated that although anti-
trust laws do not impose a requirement of due process, by denying the plaintiff
procedural protections, the NYSE was exceeding its authority under the
Exchange Act and therefore could not rely on that Act for an exemption from
the Sherman Act. Id. at 364-365.
In Villani, the district court interpreted the holding in Silver to mean that
the Exchange Act requires the NYSE to comply with the due process require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment. Villani, 348 F. Supp. at 1188 n.1. Although this
interpretation extends the actual holding in Silver, the Silver court recognized
that the lack of checks on the power of the NYSE created the potential for
abuse. Silver, 373 U.S. at 357. In Villani, the court was troubled by the lack of
counsel in disciplinary proceedings. However, the NYSE avoided a ruling
against it by adopting an amendment to the exchanges constitution allowing
representation by counsel, thus rendering the plaintiffs complaint moot. Villani,
348 F. Supp. at 1189. Although disposing of the plaintiffs claim in that suit,
the problem remains the same. Because the federal government has delegated
the enforcement of securities laws to SROs without those entities being bound
by the same limitations as the government itself, the potential for abuse per-
sists.
2o 15 U.S.C. § 78f(bX7) (1994).
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self-incrimination, double jeopardy protections and similar con-
cerns including Fourth Amendment protections with respect to
searches and seizures.
In contrast to the holdings in the Intercontinental line of
cases, several courts have held that SROs are not state actors
even when they are enforcing federal law in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. 2 5 In United States v. Solomon, Judge Friendly writ-
ing for the Second Circuit rejected Intercontinental and held
that an interrogation by the NYSE did not trigger the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 2°  In
Solomon, the NYSE called Alan Solomon, an officer of a mem-
ber firm, before a disciplinary body of the NYSE and ques-
tioned him about financial irregularities allegedly committed in
violation of both federal laws and NYSE rules. Pursuant to
NYSE rules, Solomon's failure to respond to such an inquiry
could result in suspension or expulsion.2 7 Solomon asserted
that he was coerced into testimony by the threat of immediate
loss of his livelihood if he failed to cooperate. The court did not
consider this risk to Solomon's livelihood as coercive and there-
fore did not find the NYSE rules with respect to such interro-
gation to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination for two reasons. First, as the punishment of
suspension or expulsion by the NYSE for failing to respond to
its inquiry is not mandatory, the court found that Solomon was
not coerced into giving testimony.2" Second, as the NYSE
was itself not a state actor, constitutional protections did not
become relevant.2 °
Apart from its decision with respect to the status of the
NYSE as a state actor, the Solomon court's conclusion that
205 United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975); First Heritage
Corp. v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (holding that member of NASD not entitled to due process protections in
arbitration); United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding
that broker was not entitled to protections of the Fourth Amendment when his
papers were seized by his employer and turned over to the Commission); People
v. Barysh, 408 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
"6 509 F.2d at 871 (stating that the suggestion by the court in
Intercontinental that stock exchanges are subject to due process requirements
was "dictum").
m Id at 865.
28 IM at 867 (distinguishing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)).
209 I& at 869.
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Solomon was not coerced into giving testimony as a result of
his concern with respect to suspension or expulsion ignores the
reality of NYSE procedures. An associated person or a member
firm is generally subject to regulatory authority of the SROs
that regulate the member firm,21 which, in Solomon's case,
was the NYSE. An associated person of a member firm who is
threatened with loss of livelihood and reputational damage for
failure to submit to an inquiry is subject to very real compul-
sion to testify or face sanctions which could jeopardize or elimi-
nate such person's position in the securities industry. At the
very least, further analysis of the practices of the NYSE with
respect to expulsion or suspension should have been undertaken
by the Solomon court.
The existing lower court case law with respect to SROs as
state actors when enforcing federal law is deficient in that the
analysis fails to focus on the specific role of the SROs in enforc-
ing federal law as opposed to their general historic self-
regulatory role in enforcing their own rules against their mem-
bers. Moreover, the cases fail to engage in substantial develop-
ment of a factual record with respect to the interaction of the
Commission and the SROs in regard to enforcement proceed-
ings, and the coercive power exercised by the Commission pur-
suant to Sections 19(h) and 21(e) and (f) of the Exchange Act.
The cases analyze only the state action issue as it relates to
SROs enforcing their membership rules. This was clearly the
case in Solomon where Judge Friendly concluded, "we thus
prefer to place [the] decision on the basic ground that interro-
gation by the [NYSE] in carrying out its own legitimate investi-
gatory purposes does not trigger the privilege against self-
incrimination."2 ' This conclusion was drawn even though
"Solomon's conduct violated both a rule of [the] NYSE ... and
210 This pervasive influence over members and non-members alike led to the
Silver court's conclusion that unfettered authority by SROs undermined the
rights of individuals. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359 (1963)
(stating that "[elnforcement of exchange rules, particularly those of the [NYSE]
with its immense economic power, may well, in given cases, result in competi-
tive injury to an issuer, a non-member brokerdealer, or another ... Such
unjustified self-regulatory activity can only diminish public respect for and
confidence in the integrity and efficacy of the exchange mechanism.").
211 Solomon, 509 F.2d at 867.
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federal law."2"2 Judge Friendly's analysis with respect to en-
forcement of federal law was supported by his conclusion that
the "NYSE's inquiry into [Defendant] was in pursuance of its
own interests and obligations, not as an agent of the SEC."2 3
This conclusion is without foundation. Stated simply, the
NYSE had not of its own volition undertaken to enforce federal
law. Instead, it has been required to do so as a prerequisite to
its continued existence and under threat of sanction from the
Commission. The NYSE's enforcement of its own rules may be
an historic function which is, to some extent, merely adminis-
tration of its own internal affairs. 4 However, its enforcement
of federal law is required under the Exchange Act, and this
compulsion mandates that such enforcement be subject to con-
stitutional protections.
Solomon, like the remaining lower court decisions discussed,
fails to segregate out from the many SRO functions the enforce-
ment of federal law. It is this failure to precisely analyze these
separate functions that has led to inadequate analysis of this
issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Exchanges were in existence long before the passage of the
Exchange Act. Prior to 1934, they retained the exclusive right
and obligation to enforce their rules against members and their
associated persons. SROs have thus had a long history of pri-
vate enforcement of securities regulation. This aspect of securi-
ties regulation was not federalized by passage of the Exchange
Act. SROs retain the right subject to the rule-making process
and the oversight role assigned to the Commission to enforce
internal rules even if they are more onerous than the Exchange
Act and its regulations. As a function of political compromise,
SROs were also delegated a companion function of enforcing
federal law. The obligation to enforce federal law was a requi-
site to an SRO's continued existence and could be enforced
judicially by the Commission. In this limited role, the SRO is a
212 Id. at 869.
213 Id
214 Section 6 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (1994), does require ex-
changes to enforce their own rules.
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federal actor deputized to carry out an essential enforcement
role.
This conclusion is not revolutionary. It results from a reason-
able application of mainstream state action jurisprudence. Prop-
er application of state action jurisprudence will also not lead to
revolutionary results. Two specific concerns with respect to the
application of the state action doctrine to SROs have been
raised. First, the concern that such conclusion will lead to a
substantial federalization of various similar enforcement activity
in other industries.2" This is simply not the case. The delega-
tion of federal law enforcement authority pursuant to federal
law, together with the authority to impose sanctions including
monetary penalties and suspensions, is unique to the securities
and commodities industries.21
More importantly, to the extent that such delegation exists
in other industries, the state action doctrine should be applied
consistently. Clothing SROs with state actor status will not
lead to any absurd or unintended results. Nor will it clothe
SROs with any federal authority to act in any governmental
capacity, inasmuch as state action status is only applicable in
the context of enforcing federal law. In this context, governmen-
tal status acts only as a limitation upon the enforcement activi-
ties which the SRO may undertake.
It is more than sixty years since the SROs were legislatively
deputized to enforce the federal securities laws. State action
jurisprudence, even in its most restrictive interpretations, re-
quires that constitutional protections apply in federally related
SRO actions in the same manner as they apply when such
actions are pursued by the Commission. A level playing field
for defendants in this limited dual-enforcement system is con-
stitutionally mandated.
215 See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 870.
211 See SEC REPORT, supra note 17.
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